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ABSTRACT Economic reforms and the quest for efficiency in public administration call
for the decentralization of collective bargaining and wages in the public sector in Nigeria.
But the effort to decentralize has translated into both a protracted industrial relations crisis
and intergovernmental conflict. This situation is traced to the failed effort at institutionalising
collective bargaining and the consolidation of the unified wage structure in the public sector
by the resort to ad hoc wages commissions. The distorted fiscal federalism and intergovern-
mental relations under the military in Nigeria complicated the situation, such that resolving
the federal question has become critical to returning stability to Nigeria’s industrial relations
system.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a recurring battle between the various levels of Nigerian govern-
ments on the one hand, and between these governments and organized labour on the
other, over the determination of public sector wages. Although this conflict became
egregious with the adoption of decentralised collective bargaining by the national
government in 1991, it reflects a critical industrial relations problem: the failure to
institutionalised collective bargaining in the public sector. More than this, it also
reflects the contradictions of federalism under the military. The effort to decentralise
collective bargaining served to unveil these contradictions of federal practice under
military rule and put their implication for public administration in bold relief.
The machineries set up for collective bargaining in the public sector, such as the
National Civil Service Negotiating Councils and the State Civil Service Negotiating
Councils, were never allowed to work. Public sector wages have been set through
government fiat or quasi-political wages commissions or tribunals largely set up by
the government. The implementation of agreements on wages, reached through the
machinery of nationwide negotiations that has predominated in the public sector, has
often been chaotic, attended by controversy, agitations, and widespread strikes cost-
ing the country enormous resources in terms of man-days lost. The crisis has been
unleashed by the bloated nature of the public service, which is responsible for the
huge expenditure on salaries by the government. Such expenditures became unsus-
tainable during the economic crisis that began in the 1980s. The government had
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taken centralisation to its logical conclusion by unilaterally making the structure of
wages and salaries uniform across all tiers of government in the 1970s when the
country enjoyed an enormous in-flow of petro-dollars. This was attended with a cen-
tralisation of revenue powers and adjustment of the revenue-allocation formula in
favour of the centre. When recession set in, the government imposed a wage freeze
and embarked on piecemeal retrenchment of staff. As the crisis worsened, it adopted
economic and administrative reform measures. Currency devaluation and inflation
reduced the salaries of public sector workers to mere pittances, and corruption, brain
drain, and moonlighting became the order of the day. Labour union challenges to
these measures were initially suppressed, but mounting popular protests forced some
revisions. The economic and administrative reform measures were applied piece-
meal and inconsistently, especially under the Babangida and the Abacha years as
these governments tried to sustain power.
The effort to decentralize was later introduced as a way to deflect and federalise
the problem. This was clearly the case because the federal government policy of
decentralised collective bargaining and wages was not matched by a corresponding
effort to devolve revenue powers. Thus, state governments could not pay newly
introduced salaries, nor were they confident enough to negotiate with their employ-
ees. The issue was not just the question of periodically setting an acceptable mini-
mum wage for the country. It also touched on the status of states as independent
governments with resource bases and with established and effective administrative
systems. It was also about refederalising the process of wages determination such
that wages can reflect the differing costs of living between different geographical
areas as well the differences in the ability to pay of the different levels of govern-
ments that constitute the Nigerian federation.
Assuming that the decentralization of public sector collective bargaining and
wages is inevitable, in view of the push for economic competitiveness and efficiency
in public administration in a globalized world, this essay submits that this can only
become institutionalised when meaningful federal practice and democratic values
permeate governance in Nigeria.
ISSUES IN THE DECENTRALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The structure of collective bargaining refers to a system of negotiating the wages
or remuneration of labour. Ordinarily there are two patterns of interaction between
the parties in industrial relations. These are the tripartite and bipartite patterns.
Tripartite interaction involves three parties, namely, government, employer and
labour. Government may interact as state authority or as employer. In the tripartite
interaction, the government negotiates or consults with employer and worker repre-
sentatives on important industrial relations policies and other macroeconomic poli-
cies that touch on fundamental issues of development. Bipartite interaction involves
two parties in industrial relations. The major issues discussed and negotiated usually
centre on wages and salaries, and working conditions. The interaction may be
between government and employers, government and labour, or between labour and
employer. When government negotiates with labour in this role, it acts in its capac-
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ity as an employer. Tripartism usually occurs at the national level, and at the level of
the various governments in a federal system. Bipartism may be carried out at the
national, industrial sector, parastatal, firm, or plant levels. Thus, according to the
level at which bipartism is carried out, collective bargaining is considered central-
ized or decentralized. In the public sector, decentralization seeks to shift the cover-
age of collective agreements from the national level to the level of the various
employer governments, government departments, and parastatals. In the private sec-
tor, industrywide bargaining shifts to the enterprise and/or plant level.
Generally, certain economic and political changes drive the decentralization of
collective bargaining in organizations. These are changes in production, changes in
occupational structure, and increases in international economic integration driven by
intense deregulation and competition. The rise of “diversified quality production”
and “flexible specialization” dictate a reduction in union control of job contents as
organizations seek new ways of organizing work. This has increased the importance
of work organization and has thrown up shop-floor issues requiring the decentraliza-
tion of collective bargaining. Where organizational structures of corporations are
decentralized, it is usually followed by a greater independence of business units or
profit centres. Responsibility for industrial relations is passed to lower managers in
the decentralized corporation. Thus, corporate diversification spurs decentralization
of the industrial relations staff and, consequently, the decentralization of collective
bargaining.
In Europe, changes in the occupational structure – such as increased differentia-
tion of the workforce, the relative decline in the number of blue-collar workers and
the concomitant increase in white-collar and professional unions, and the rise of
public sector unions that have reduced the capacity of private sector blue-collar
workers to dominate collective bargaining as they did in the early post war period –
have worked to reduce interest in centralized bargaining. Workers, it is also claimed,
have become less willing to join together to pursue common objectives or sacrifice
their personal gain for the benefit of other workers. This change of heart implies a
decline in the appeal of centralized bargaining structures producing standardized
labour contract terms. Integration within a single European market has also under-
mined the basis for centralized bargaining at the national level (Katz, 1993: 15;
Wallerstein et al., 1997: 380).
Constraints on public finance, balance of payments deficits, exchange rate fluctua-
tions, and inflationary pressures have occasioned the worldwide implementation of
neo-liberal economic reforms that aim to reduce government intervention in the
economy. Government interventions, it has been argued, “misallocate labour, waste
resources through rent-seeking, impair adjustments to economic shocks, and deter
investment, thereby reducing rates of growth” (Freeman, 1993: 119). Deregulation
of the economy calls for de-collectivisation of the industrial relations process. It dis-
favours bureaucratic controls. Privatisation and commercialisation of state-owned
industries, core aspects of these reforms, grant considerable autonomy to such orga-
nizations in determining the salaries and conditions of service of their employees.
Economic deregulation pushes for a flexible labour market and thus translates into
decentralizing wage bargaining to the individual worker-employer level if possible.
It also involves the removal or erosion of minimum wage machinery, so that labour
13Decentralizing Public Sector of Federal Practice in Nigeria
????????????????????????? ????
costs will fall and the “quasivoluntarily unemployed queuing for formal sector jobs
will filter back into available informal sector jobs” (Standing, 1991: 23).
Attitudes toward decentralized bargaining are largely determined by the advan-
tages that are likely to accrue to the parties involved within the given context. Katz
(1993) notes that the structure of collective bargaining is not only complex; it is
very influential to bargaining outcomes and affects the roles of unions and manage-
ment. It also affects the roles of corporate industrial relations staff and exerts signifi-
cant effects on the internal politics of unions. Bargaining structure influences and is
influenced by the distribution of bargaining power. Citing John R. Commons (1909)
and Lloyd Ulman (1995), he states that unions use centralized bargaining to
strengthen union leverage at the bargaining table. Large employers and their unions
may favour industry wide bargaining as a device through which they “cartelize” the
industry and drive out low cost competition.
For firms, heightened international competition often creates the need for lower
labour costs and wider skill differentials. Hence, employers prefer decentralized bar-
gaining because it gives them the flexibility and bargaining leverage that will facili-
tate their response to this need. Decentralized collective bargaining may be a useful
tool through which employers gain bargaining power advantage. Employers seem to
benefit from the ability to play plant or local unions off against one another. Yet
employers, after gaining lower wage outcomes or wider skill differentials through
whipsawing, may in the future prefer to return to centralized bargaining because of
the advantages it provides (e.g., stability, predictability, and economies of scale).
Although centralized bargaining enables unions to remove working conditions out
of competition and gain whipsaw advantage, decentralized bargaining provides the
opportunity for local union leaders, as well as workers at many sites, to participate
in shop-floor and strategic business decisions. Workers who have benefited from
some of the more flexible work schedules that have been negotiated prefer decen-
tralized bargaining. Local unions may agree to decentralize simply as part of a pack-
age of concessions in return for keeping their own plant in business.
While the level of centralization is highest when the government sets wages in the
private sector, the most centralized bargaining system is at the level of the peak
organization(s) of workers, employers, and government. This is usually described by
the term “corporatism.” Corporatist arrangements do have their strong and weak
points. Corporatist industrial relations institutions are often defended on the ground
that they enable wage settlers to incorporate various externalities in their decision
that would be ignored by actors with only local concerns. Unions are frequently
described as playing a n-person prisoner’s dilemma game in which decentralized
action results in collectively suboptimal outcomes. In particular, it is argued that
when unions act collectively, they accept greater wage restraint than they willingly
concede when they act independently. The prisoner’s dilemma model suggests that
the more encompassing the union movement, the greater the concentration of
unions, and the more centralized the authority of the peak association, the more
likely the collectively optimal cooperative solution can be obtained. Those who
argue against corporatist arrangements, however, believe that centralized wage-set-
ting suffers many of the same informational and incentive failures as central plan-
ning. Still others have taken a middle position, maintaining that corporatist
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wage-setting institutions worked well in the past but have become less efficient or
less viable over time. Although, corporatist institutions generated good outcomes in
the first three decades following the Second World War, this argument goes, recent
economic and political changes in Europe are forcing corporatist institutions to be
dismantled everywhere (Wallerstein et al., 1997: 379).
THE ROAD TO THE CENTRALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND WAGES IN NIGERIA
The process of the establishment of the colonial administration largely deter-
mined the wage structure in the colonial era. Because different areas were conquered
at different times and administered separately, there was no uniform system of wage
rates across the country. The division of the country into distinct administrative units
circumscribed the application of most wage rates and other conditions of employ-
ment for a while. Private and public employers made reference to prevailing terms
of employment in their own immediate area of operation when it was convenient.
What emerged was the coexistence of district, urban, and regional wage rates, with
criteria for fixing rates remaining largely arbitrary and subject to the whims of
employers (Otobo, 1992: 126-127). From the 1900s ad hoc commissions set wage
rates in Nigeria or committees set up to look into labour problems in specific sec-
tions of the country.
The expansion of the public sector wage labour provided room for the emergence
of trade unions. These became very active during the general fall in living condi-
tions that followed World War II. The first general strike in demand for a cost-of-liv-
ing allowance (COLA) enjoyed the support of the unemployed, mainly
ex-servicemen demobilized after the war, and forced the colonial government to
look critically on its provincial wages committees that had been handling wage
problems. Whitely Councils as collective bargaining institutions were set up for the
public services in 1948.(1) These councils were the first collective bargaining institu-
tions initiated by the government to provide avenues for worker participation in
determining the terms and conditions of service in the public sector. Whitleyism was
an all-embracing machinery of a national scope, covering federal, state and (some-
times) local government employees (Fashoyin, 1980: 105-106). Thus, it constituted
a centralized form of collective bargaining.
But Whitelyism did not work in Nigeria, because the councils were reduced to
mere consultative bodies by the government whose representatives often dominated
negotiation meetings. Officials hardly allowed staff to attend such meetings
(Fashoyin, 1978: 70).
What is more, with the introduction of federal principles in the administration of
the country by the Macpherson Constitution of 1951, regional governments and
their employees dealt with wage at the regional levels (Otobo, 1992: 136). For this
purpose regional governments established wages review commissions, and wage
levels differed from region to region reflecting the budgetary disparities among the
various governments. But this regional approach to wage fixing became increasingly
encumbered by politics. Wages became a political instrument used by rival political
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parties to increase their electoral fortunes. For instance, in 1949, the National
Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) commenced a demand for five shillings as
the minimum daily wage in order to retain the support of workers. The Action
Group (AG), with an eye on the federal elections in 1954, announced the award of
five shillings wage to daily paid labour throughout the then Western Region. In
1954, the Nigerian People’s Congress, the ruling party in the north, in turn granted
two wages increases to its daily paid labour (September and October). Although the
first followed the recommendation of the Provincial Wages Committee, the second
was purely a political move as parties struggled to demonstrate their concern for the
common man (Yesufu, 1984: 158-159). This politicisation exacerbated the instabil-
ity in the structure of wages until the late 1950s.
It was not until 1963, when the government faced severe pressures from trade
unions for a review of wages and working conditions, that a modification of the
structure and scope of collective bargaining was attempted. This was through the
Morgan Commission of 1963-1964 set up by the federal government. The commis-
sion sought to remove the shortcomings of the Whitley Councils and noted “collec-
tive bargaining between governments and employees, through Whitley Councils,
has hardly been effective” (Fashoyin, 1987: 7). It recommended separate machiner-
ies of negotiation for the various cadres of public sector employees and divided the
country into four wage zones. A special National Wages Board with responsibility
for ensuring a minimum rate of pay for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the
different zones was recommended in the hope that a national minimum wage would
be attained with time. However, the federal government rejected some of its recom-
mendations, including the division of the country into four wage zones, arguing that
the suggested zones did not reflect the difference in cost of living in the various
areas. The suggested national minimum wage was also rejected on the ground that
its computation was based on “a living wage,” which, the government insisted,
departed from the essential pattern of expenditure on which the existing wages were
based. The trade unions were furious over the government’s position, and conflicts
over the issues dragged on until 1 June 1964 when a general strike commenced. The
strike continued until the government agreed to set up a tripartite national negotiat-
ing body to resolve the matter, with the Morgan Commission report as the basis for
the negotiations. The negotiating body divided the country into six areas and set a
specific minimum wage for each area (Ananaba, 1969: 241-250).
Institutions to support collective bargaining, such as the National Wages Advisory
Council and the National Labour Advisory Council earlier recommended by the
Morgan Commission, were eventually established in 1965. The National Labour
Advisory Council, a tripartite body of government, management, and labour,
advised the government on (1) the operation and practicality of existing and pro-
posed legislation and the application of ILO convention recommendations, (2) peri-
odic review of the labour laws pertaining to wages and conditions of employment to
recommend such change as might be necessary, and (3) evaluation of the function-
ing of industrial relations machineries in the country. The National Wages Advisory
Council with representatives of government, employers, and labour, together with
four independent experts chosen from the universities, performed two main func-
tions: (1) observe, coordinate and advise government on all aspects of the National
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Minimum Wage Policy for the entire nation, and (2) analyse the trends in industrial
relations in the country, methods of dispute settlement, and the effects of a National
Wages Policy on economic development. These institutions faced the same fate as
the earlier Whitely Councils and were moribund during the national crisis and civil
war of 1966-1970 (Otobo, 1992: 137-138). Even so, the Morgan Commission
marked the end of regionalism in wage determination. It successfully redirected
wage competition from between the regions to between the public and private sec-
tors. This was made possible by recommending wage zones that had nothing to do
with various sub-national units but was based on indices of cost of living in the geo-
graphical areas. All these were underlined by the content of the second national
development plan that increasingly provided a greater role for the national govern-
ment.
Indeed, when agitations by workers for improvement in their working conditions
increased immediately after the civil war, the national government set up the Adebo
Commission (1970-1971), which was the first to carry out a comprehensive review
of wages and salaries at all levels in all the public services, and in the statutory pub-
lic corporations and state-owned or co-assisted schools. The commission inquired
into areas in which wages, salaries, and conditions of employment could be harmo-
nized with those of the private sector. With regard to negotiating wages, the Adebo
Commission upheld the position of the Morgan Commission that collective bargain-
ing was the most desirable means of determining wages and conditions of work.
Accordingly, it revived the Whitley Council system, providing for skilled and
unskilled workers. It made a case for the use of collective bargaining for both the
public and private sectors of the economy on the ground that it would keep wages in
proper ‘national balance’ both as regards comparison between sectors, and in rela-
tion to available real resources... [and] assure, simultaneously, distributive equity,
economic growth, full employment and monetary stability (Sokunbi, 1992: 127). It
also recommended that Wages Boards and Industrial Councils be provided as
machinery for the determination of wages and conditions of services for sections of
the labour force that are outside the purview of collective agreements and areas
where wages are unreasonably low.
Following the approval of the commission’s report, the Federal Military
Government issued the Wages Board and Industrial Councils Decree No. 1 of 1973
to repeal the Wages Ordinance of 1957. This provided the legal basis for the
Industrial Wages Board and the National Wages Board that were established for the
private and public sectors respectively. The decree also permitted the federal com-
missioner (minister) to set up Area Minimum Wages Committees for the states after
consultation with the state governments concerned. State governors could also
establish equivalents for local government workers after due consultation with the
commissioner. These institutions were to make recommendations to the minister on
wages and conditions of employment in these areas. The minister might then, by
order, fix wages and conditions of employment, which, thereafter, become “statutory
minimum wages” or “statutory minimum conditions”.
Subsequent military governments not only maintained the tradition of setting up
wages commissions, but also went farther to make the structure of wages and
salaries uniform in the public sector. In 1974, the Udoji Commission recommended
17Decentralizing Public Sector of Federal Practice in Nigeria
????????????????????????? ????
a unified civil service structure and called for a revival of the bipartite machineries
for negotiation in the public sector through the creation of Public Service
Negotiating Councils. It recommended a technical and data-gathering Public Service
Review Research Unit to facilitate the work of these bipartite bodies. In accordance
with the structure of the civil service, National Public Service Negotiating Council I
was also created to deal with problems of the senior administrative and professional
classes. Council II was established for intermediate grades and junior non-technical
grades, clerical, executive secretary and typists’ cadres, while Council III dealt with
technical cadres, medical and health personnel, nurses and midwives, customs, and
immigration. In line with the prevailing political and administrative structure of the
country, States Public Service Negotiating Councils I, II, III were designed to tackle
similar issues for the corresponding classes of public employees in the nineteen
states.
Nevertheless, the Udoji Commission did not leave the adjustment of wages to
these councils. It went ahead to award increments in wages and salaries of public
employees that were implemented uniformly among all the tiers of government.
What is more, mounting protests, disputes, and strikes by private sector workers
pressing for similar increments caused the government to advise employers in that
sector to implement the awards. But the civil service was thrown into confusion as
several complaints were levied against the new grades and salary scales announced
in the Government White Paper on the Udoji Report. Eventually, the Williams
Public Service Review Panel had to be set up to look into the complaints and to sub-
mit suitable recommendations to the Federal Military Government. The panel re-
commended a unified salary structure not only for the federal service but also for the
entire public sector (including states). Its argument was that it would create a situa-
tion that allowed equal pay for equal work irrespective of the area of the public sec-
tor in which an employee might be engaged (Federal Ministry of Labour, 1991:
174). Thus, the apparent contradiction between the decentralized collective bargain-
ing machineries and the centralized wage structure was resolved in favour of com-
plete centralization.
The federal government went on to establish an Anti-Inflation Task Force to
address the impact of the Udoji awards on the economy. The task force reiterated the
need for the establishment of Productivity, Prices and Incomes Board (PPIB) that
had earlier been recommended and emphasized by the Adebo and Udoji commis-
sions respectively. The PPIB was to prevent the reoccurrence of a similar crisis in
the future by establishing norms and guidelines for wages and salaries review,
undertaking studies of wage and salary trends, and advising government on trends in
other incomes apart from salaries and wages on which action may be needed in the
interest of equitable income distribution.
The PPIB would have been supportive of collective bargaining, but it was made
moribund when the military government imposed a wage freeze in 1976, the same
year the board was inaugurated. As for the bipartite negotiating councils, the gov-
ernment did not make recourse to them in wage determination, thereby giving the
impression that it believed that collective bargaining was “unfit for settling wages
and conditions of service in the public sector” (Fashoyin, 1980: 114-115). Indeed,
the uniformisation of the salary structure and wage levels across the public sector
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actually foreclosed collective bargaining at the level of the various governments and
pararastals with the exception of the centre. Later in 1975, as part of the govern-
ment’s effort to establish a corporatist industrial relations system, it introduced a
policy of Limited Intervention and Guided Democracy and went on to cancel the
registration of four labour organizations in 1976. It then restructured approximately
1,000 existing unions (mostly house unions) into 42 industrial unions under a single
central labour organization, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC). Following the out-
come of the Adebiyi Tribunal, which inquired into the administration and finances
of trade unions, eleven union leaders were barred from participating in any form of
trade union activity for life. New laws were enacted to regulate trade disputes and
other industrial relations matters by the military government, even though labour
matters had constitutionally been under the concurrent list.
FEDERALISM UNDER MILITARY RULE IN NIGERIA
The centralization of collective bargaining and wages occurred within the context
of the centralization of the economic management of the country. As I will show
presently, although this was set in motion by the logic of central planning, it accele-
rated and became total, under military rule in the absence of constitutionalism and
the rule of law, although the military did not adopt an official policy of unitarism
after the failed attempt by General Agoyi Ironsi in 1966.(2) The demand of the war
effort became the alibi for imposing the military command structure on the admini-
stration of the country by piecemeal legislation and other sundry actions.
The constitutions in post-colonial Nigeria have always assigned decisional ulti-
macy to the national government, but the dominance of the centre over the states
gradually progressed from relative independence of the regions in the first republic
to a situation where the centre has become so strong that the country can effectively
carry unitarism at the threshold of the fourth republic. As John Ayoade has noted, in
the first republic, the regions were not only very strong, they also contested the sov-
ereign status of the federal centre. This was the case for two reasons. The first was
the decision of the political leaders to remain in the regions while they delegated
their subordinates to the centre. From 1951 to 1959, the leaders of the three regions
engaged in the consolidation of their parties in their respective regions. Different
parties dominated each region, and the federal government that emerged after the
1959 elections was a coalition of the Northern Peoples’ Congress and the National
Council of Nigerian Citizens. The Action Group was the opposition party. The situa-
tion was such that, more often than not, operational orders issued from the regions.
The second reason for the weakness of the centre in the first republic was the size
and enormous resources that were under the control of the regions. In the words of
Ayoade, “The size and resources plus the fact that federal leadership was a sub-
sidiary of regional leadership accounted for the wide powers allocated to the regions
vis-à-vis the centre” (Ayoade, 1988: 22-23). However, the advent of the military wit-
nessed the gradual and massive erosion of the power of the regions.
The political crisis of 1966, the coup and counter coup, and the resultant civil war
engendered major changes in the state during this period that were to have conse-
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quences for collective bargaining in Nigeria. Once the war began in 1967, the fed-
eral government divided the country into twelve states and centralized the manage-
ment of resources in order to support the war effort. According to Decree No 27 of
1967 the “Legislative and Executive powers of the newly created states in Nigeria
were limited for the time being to residual matters.” Although, General Yakubu
Gowon, the then head-of-state had assured the country that national institutions
would be redefined after the war through a constitution that would be drafted by rep-
resentatives of all sectors of the country, he later announced in 1974 that the imple-
mentation of the third national development plan had made it imperative that
resource management remain centralized. According to him, “If we are to rely on
the existing revenue allocation formula, no state government except two will be in a
position to finance even a single year’s program on the basis of the projected sur-
plus” (Esajere, 2001: 8-9). The centralization of the management of resources was
also accompanied by greater intervention of the national government in the labour
relations process generally. In 1968 and 1969, the military government introduced
the Trade Disputes Emergency Provisions decrees that outlawed strikes during the
war. The argument was that given the war situation, strikes amounted to sabotage
because they would inevitably divert the attention of the federal government. Thus,
the war and dictates of central planning not only marked the recentralisation of
power within Nigeria’s federalism, they also marked the centralization of the ma-
nagement of labour relations.
The creation of states in 1967 by the military, which split the existing four regions
into 12 states, reduced the influence of each of the units at the centre. Over the
years, the number of states has been multiplied from12 to 19 states in 1976, to 21
states in 1987, to 30 states in 1991, and to 36 states in 1996. States creation has been
done largely by decrees issued by central military governments rather than by refer-
endum, as is the case in most federations. Furthermore, it has involved a deflation of
the country into smaller units or territorial fragmentation rather than the addition of
new territories, thus leading to shrinkage of the size of each state. At the same time,
it involved a multiplication of administrative structures and an expansion of the pub-
lic sector. States have been created in Nigeria in a manner and with such rapidity
that many states now lack viable sources of revenue of their own. According to the
Central Bank of Nigeria, only a few states and local governments can provide up to
30% of their planned expenditures from their internal revenue generation efforts.
The statutory allocation from the Federation Account between 1990 and 1994 con-
stituted, on the average, over 70 percent of the current revenues of the state govern-
ments, while internally generated revenues accounted for only 17.8 percent. The
balance was by special discretionary grants from the federal government. Table 1
shows that between 1988 and 1996, over 96 percent of total recurrent revenue was
accounted for by federally collected revenue while states independent revenue
accounted for an average of only 3.0 percent (Central Bank of Nigeria, 1995). It is
also clear that state independent revenue as a percentage of total revenue has wit-
nessed a decrease in recent years.
Thus, states have increasingly found it difficult to finance their statutory functions
and services allotted to them. They have had to rely on grants and subsidies from the
federal government in order to cope with minimal responsibilities. Clearly, states
20 E.R. AIYEDE
????????????????????????? ????
creation has not attained most of the gains of decentralization while incurring the
disadvantages. The multiplication of administrative structures has served to increase
the cost of recurrent expenditure while leaving little for capital development.
Perhaps this is at the heart of infrastructural neglect and, certainly, the intergovern-
mental conflicts that have attended the effort to decentralize collective bargaining.
Table 2 shows the rise in the cost of administration in Nigeria.
Key state-based revenue sources, such as the personal income tax, vehicle licens-
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Table 1. Relative Contribution of Federal and State Government to States’ Total Current Revenue.
Year Total Current Revenue Statutory Allocation from State Independent 
(N’ Million) Federation Account (%) Revenue (%)
1988 10,992.0 80.3 16.7
1989 13,546.2 79.6 20.4
1990 18,670.0 85.4 14.6
1991 22,581.4 86.1 13.9
1992 32,673.6 83.9 16.1
1993 37,740.6 84.8 15.2
1994 49,506.1 77.9 22.1
1995 136,002.0 87.3 12.7
1996 179,029.6 89.1 10.9
1997 193,925.2 85.9 14.1
1998 286,405.0 89.8 10.2
1999 337,980.2 89.9 10.1
2000 346,168.2 89.1 10.9
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics (1995), Central Bank of Nigeria (1995).
Table 2. Recurrent Expenditure of Federal and State Governments (N’ million).
Year Federal Annual % States Annual % Total Annual % No. of 
(N’ million) Change (N’ million) Change (N’ million) Change (Total) States
1984 6,275.4 ? 4,590.6 ? 10,866.0 ? 19
1985 7,215.3 15.0 4,823.1 5.1 12,038.4 10.8 19
1986 7,696.9 6.8 4,601.0 – 4.6 12,297.9 2.2 19
1987 15,646.2 103.3 5,721.2 24.3 21,367.4 73.8 21
1988 19,409.4 24.1 7,193.4 25.7 26,602.8 24.5 21
1989 25,914.2 33.5 8,140.6 13.2 34,054.8 28.0 21
1990 36,219.6 39.8 13,387.5 64.5 49,607.1 45.7 21
1991 38,243.5 5.6 15,872.3 18.6 54,115.8 9.1 30
1992 53,128.9 38.9 20,780.3 31.0 73,909.2 36.6 30
1993 136,727.1 157.3 29,992.3 44.3 166,719.4 125.6 30
1994 89,974.6 –34.2 35,178.8 17.3 125,153.4 – 24.9 30
1995 101,551.9 50.5 54,366.5 28.9 155,918.4 24.6 30
1996 124,291.3 22.4 54,824.8 19.9 179,120.1 14.9 36
1997 158,563.5 27.6 58,956.2 8.4 217,519.7 21.4 36
1998 178,097.8 12.3 75,124.7 27.4 253,225.5 16.4 36
1999 449,662.4 152.4 102,690.1 36.7 552,352.5 118.1 36
2000 461,608.5 2.7 192,101.8 87.1 653,710.3 0.2 36
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1995).
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ing fees, land charges, and sales tax, are inherently limited as sources of public rev-
enues, often weakly or inefficiently exploited by state administrations, or sometimes
regulated, restricted, or even appropriated by the centre. For example, the federal
government has imposed uniform national rates for income tax since the 1970s. It
also currently appropriates a major portion of the lucrative sales tax, which has been
administered as federal value added tax (VAT) since 1994. In summary, states cre-
ation has involved the centralisation of resource controls, reducing states to mere
channels for the distribution of revenue from these resources, albeit inequitably, to
the constituent communities without improving the independent revenue and admin-
istrative effectiveness of the states. The resources of the states decreased through the
stripping of the power of state governments over some major sources of independent
revenue by the national government under military rule. Table 3 shows that the fed-
eral government has legislative power for 15 taxes and controls the most viable
avenues for revenue generation.
There is now a heavy reliance of state governments on federal funds. The states
and local government have become heavily dependent on federal allocations for rev-
enue. In most cases, federal allocation accounts for more than eighty percent of
states and local government revenue. This was not the case before the advent of the
military into politics as shown in Table 4. That table shows the changes in the
importance of derivation as a factor in the revenue allocation formula in postcolo-
nial Nigeria.
The military abused the federal government’s leadership and policy shaping roles
through the arbitrary usurpation of the power to perform certain federation func-
tions, like the restructuring of the internal boundaries of the federation, the determi-
nation of revenue jurisdiction, and the adjustment of the revenue allocation-formula.
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Table 3. Nigeria’s Major Taxes.
No. of Taxes Jurisdiction
Legislation Administration and Collection
Under Federal Government 15 8
Under State Government 6 11
Under Local Government 0 2
Total 21 21
Source: Development Policy Centre (1998).
Table 4. Federal-State Percentage in Petroleum Proceeds 1960-1999.
Years Producing State Federal Government Distributable Pool
1960-67 50 20 30
1967-69 50 50 ?
1969-71 45 55 ?
1971-75 45 minus off shore proceed 55 plus off shore proceed ?
1975-79 20 minus off shore 80 plus off shore ?
1979-81 ? 100 ?
1982-92 1.5 minus off shore 80 plus off shore ?
1992-99 Three percent minus off shore 97 plus off shore ?
1999- 13 minus off shore 87 plus off shore ?
Source: Esajere (2001: 8).
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What operated in Nigeria under the military was administrative decentralization
without political and fiscal decentralization. This was entrenched in the series of
constitutions prepared under the rule of the military, including the 1999 Con-
stitution. Right now, the federal government collects most of the buoyant taxes and
allocates the revenue to lower levels of government through the federation account
for them to carry out their expenditure responsibilities. Table 5 shows the centraliz-
ing movement in vertical revenue allocation. Although it appears that direct statu-
tory allocations to the federal government have fallen marginally over the years,
actual total revenue to the federal government has been on the rise. This is the case
because the same government not only controls the Special Funds; it determines the
size and use of the Special Funds. Thus, the total allocation to the federal govern-
ment has never fallen below 55 percent. On the other hand, allocations to the states
fell from 32.6 percent in 1988 to 24.0 percent in 1999. The responsibilities of the
states have not only increased, the number of states has also multiplied. The rev-
enue-allocation system was thus affected by the distorted intergovernmental rela-
tions system in which the states were reduced to administrative units of the national
government.(3)
PRESSURES FOR DECENTRALIZING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CHALLENGES
The weakness of these federal structures began to manifest when the country
began to face severe balance of payments difficulties in the early 1980s, and several
states could not pay the wages of their workforce for more than six months, which
lead to widespread strikes. Calls were made for the first time after the Williams
Panel for the decentralization of the wages determination process to reflect the abil-
ity to pay of the various levels of government. But the elected state governments,
perceived the difficulty in paying workers’ salaries to be caused by a temporary eco-
nomic crisis, the oil shock of the early 1980s, and avoided the decentralisation
option, which would have pitted them against labour unions. Believing that the oil
market would improve, the governments resorted to borrowing from both local and
international sources to pay salaries (Olukoshi, 1993: 1-2). But as efforts to revamp
the economy yielded little gains and public debts continued to rise, the federal gov-
ernments resorted to down-sizing the public sector by dismissing those found
engaged in acts of indiscipline, especially under the General Buhari military govern-
ment (Olukoshi, 1989: 34). Then in 1985, General Babangida declared an eighteen-
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Table 5. Nigerian Federation Account Revenue Distribution Formula.
Year Federal State Local Special Funds
1988 55.4 32.6 10.2 1.2
1989 55.0 32.4 10.1 2.5
1990 50.9 26.8 13.3 0.9
1991 50.5 30.0 15.0 4.5
1992 49.1 24.9 19.5 6.5
1993-2000 48.5 24.0 20.0 7.5
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (1995).
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month state of economic emergency, which included compulsory deductions of
between two to twenty percent from the salaries of workers in the public sector,
including those of the armed forces. State military governors also took a clue from
the federal government and effected deductions from the salaries of their workers. In
June 1986, Babangida introduced neo-liberal reforms and put a stop to wage deduc-
tions following clamour for a stop to these deductions by labour unions (Adesina,
1995: 1-26). Further pressures from labour unions forced the government to lift the
existing wage freeze in 1991, introducing a new policy of “Deregulated Collective
Bargaining”. The government defined the content of the new policy in this manner:
In the public sector the government accepts that time has come for collective bargain-
ing to take firm root and for wage fixing to reflect the varieties and differences in the
ability to pay, as regards the Federal Government, the State Governments, Local
Government and the Parastatals. The representatives of these various tiers of govern-
ments and agencies will negotiate directly with their appropriate industrial unions at
the level of Federal, State, or Local Governments and the Parastatals, but always bear-
ing in mind the ability to pay and the imperatives of a good remuneration policy. The
Federal Government will cease to issue general circulars of universal applicability
with regards to wages, fringe benefits and conditions of employment to all public
agencies (Babangida, 1991: 94).
The aim of the policy, according to the government, was to promote satisfactory
collective bargaining in the public sector as well as relate obligations to fiscal
strength of each level of government. The central government seemed to be striving
to divert the attention of the states, which was mounting pressure for an increased
share in the revenue allocation formula, to find independent solutions to the wage
problem. The decentralized collective bargaining necessarily involved the decentral-
isation of wages and salary negotiations. Henceforth, the central government was to
be concerned with negotiating wages with its own employees only and establishing
national minimum wages. But the upward adjustments of the wages 
of federal civil servants between 1992 and 1993 precipitated a series of strikes 
and protests by sub-national government employees demanding corresponding
increases. The labour unions vehemently opposed variations in the pay between
employees of the state governments and those of the federal government. Bipartite
discussions between several state chapters of the labour congress and the state gov-
ernments did not yield any agreement. The governors eventually went to the central
government for help to rise funds to pay the new centrally determined wages to their
employees. Since then, across the board upward adjustments in public service pay
have always precipitated intergovernmental challenges. Thus decentralizing collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector was destined to be a thorny issue to be inherited
by the civilian government of Nigeria’s fourth republic.
The first play of this problem came barely a year into the fourth republic.
President Obasanjo had announced a new wage structure after a series of negotiation
rounds with the NLC during his address to workers on May Day 2000. He simulta-
neously announced 5,500 as the new national minimum wage, and went on to pro-
duce a wage table, which was sent to state governments to facilitate negotiations
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with their employees. The table ascertained that the states could pay a minimum of
6,500 against the 7,500 for federal employees. Neither the branches of the NLC
nor the state governments were happy with this action of the national government.
The insistence by state government workers on wage parity with federal workers
threw some of the opposing states into fresh industrial relations crises. While oil-
producing states that began to enjoy 13 percent derivation from the federation
account (provided by the 1999 Constitution) adopted the pay structure for federal
employees, non-oil producing states insisted that paying the new wages recom-
mended by the federal government was unsupportable, as it would amount to spend-
ing over 70 percent of their total revenue on wage bills alone. Some of the states
went farther to question the revenue sharing formula, arguing that it was the
inequitable formula that was responsible for the problem. Lagos state governor,
Senator Bola Tinubu, for instance, maintained that its wage problem was the result
of the skewed nature of Nigeria’s fiscal federalism which enables the federal gov-
ernment to appropriate most of the revenue and distributing only a paltry sum
among the various states and local governments.(4) On the bargaining process, the
state governments admitted that it was unreasonable for there to be uniform salaries
among all the states considering the divergences in revenue capabilities and respon-
sibilities, but questioned the legality of the federal government’s action of reaching
an agreement with the unions on the possible wage structure of sub-national govern-
ment staff without consulting with the governments, arguing that the processes of
negotiations as well as the agreements were against the spirit of federalism. The
Federal Government then withdrew the circular. But by this time the feeling of
inequity in the Nigerian fiscal federalism had exploded into a renewed call for devo-
lution.
Pressures for further decentralisation, which had accompanied the agitations for
political liberalisation in the 1990s by civil society groups, were then taken over by
state governments especially those of the south. The two prominent groups in these
regards were the Summit of Governors and Members of the National Assembly
from the South-south Geo-Political Zone, and the Conference of Southern
Governors.
The first group, largely comprised by oil producing states, has called for the abro-
gation of the Land Use Act and other obnoxious laws which empower the federal
government to control the natural resources found in the territories of their commu-
nities, thereby denying them access to the revenue derived there from. It also con-
tested the distinction between offshore and on-shore oil in the implementation of the
13 percent derivation revenue allocation to oil-producing states by the federal gov-
ernment, insisting that offshore oil belonged to the states. The federal government,
on the other hand, maintained that offshore resources belong to the federation. This
group has challenged the federal government’s position through a series of public
declaration and communiqués. It tabled a bill before the House of Representative on
9 May 2001 through the Honourable Temi Harriman of Delta State and 13 others,
requesting the amendment of the Petroleum Act to, among other things, (1) compel
companies to site their headquarters in their main areas of operation, (2) vest the
ownership and control of petroleum resources in the oil producing states, local gov-
ernment and communities, thus reversing the spirit of the extant laws, (3) reserve 70
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percent of the employment opportunities in the oil companies for Nigerians, (4)
encourage local businessmen and investors to participate in all aspects of oil opera-
tion, and (5) reduce tension, poverty and violence in the oil producing communities
through the provision of better living conditions (Abati, 2001: 10). But the bill
threw the house into a tempestuous session and was rejected with 81 “No” votes
against 64 “Yes” votes, with a sharp north/south divide on the issue.
The Federal Government in a bid to strengthen its position has taken the states to
the Supreme Court in a suit that is yet to be decided, asking the Court to declare that
“the natural resources located within the exclusive economic zones and the conti-
nental shelf of Nigeria are subject to the provision of any treaty or other written
agreement between Nigeria and any neighbouring littoral foreign state, derive from
the federation and not from any state” (Djebah, 2001: 9). This move doused any
expectation of a marked redress of the distortions of military federalism being
brought about by the Chief Clement Ebri Constitution Review Committee set up by
the president. Indeed when the Committee submitted its report in March 2001, it
barely answered such expectation by the very limited devolution it recommended,
while correctly identifying the several problematical issues relating to federal prac-
tice as defined by the 1999 Constitution.(5) In fact, the zonal presentation of the
report witnessed several criticisms and public demonstrations by political and cul-
tural organisations opposed to its content and procedure. These organisations have
insisted on the convening of a sovereign national conference to redefine the struc-
ture and basis of managing Nigeria.
On its part, the Conference of Southern Governors made both short-and-long term
demands. It has called for a resuscitation of the state/local government joint
accounts into which the federal government should pay all revenue due to the local
governments as contained in Section 162 (5-7) of the 1999 Constitution. Currently
federal allocations to local governments are paid directly into individual local gov-
ernment accounts. The Conference of Southern Governors wants to limit the Federal
Government’s powers of control to the Consolidated Revenue Account (Federal
Government Account) in order to put a stop to the Federal Government’s encroach-
ment on the Federation Account. Accordingly, it demanded that all funds, revenues
and income collected by the federal government on behalf of the federation to be
paid into the distributable pool account (Federation Account). It also insisted that
the federal government should stop the first line deduction system (FLDS), a proce-
dure whereby the federal government first deducted a percentage of funds credited
to the federation account for the payment of debt before sharing the balance among
the federal, state and local governments. The Conference of Southern Governors
considered this unconstitutional.
Furthermore, they wanted the Education Tax Fund and the proceeds of privatisa-
tion and excess crude oil funds, belonging to the federation at large, to be shared
through the federation account on the agreed sharing formula. It questioned the fed-
eral government’s power to unilaterally roll over balances in the Federation Account
or in any other special account derived from that account to another fiscal year. It
argued that such funds should revert to the federation account at the end of the year
and be distributed in accordance with the approved distribution ratios. The
Conference called for an accelerated review of the current revenue allocation for-
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mula to enable it to better relate the allocation to federal government with its limited
responsibilities, and called for an equitable distribution of the proceeds from the
value added tax (VAT).
The Conference of Southern Governors considered the National Primary
Education Commission (NPEC) and State Primary Education Board (SPEB) being
run by the national government as unconstitutional and demanded that NPEC be
scrapped and SPEB put under the control of state governments.(6) Finally, it has
called for a constitutional amendment to support the establishment of state police to
improve security in Nigeria as a basis for making the country attractive to foreign
investors and appealed to the states that have implemented Sharia to ensure that it
applied to Muslims only.(7)
CONCLUSION
The logic of central planning and the imposition of the military command struc-
ture on a supposedly federal system moved Nigeria from a decentralised collective
bargaining system to a situation where public sector pay was nationally determined
and made uniform across all levels of government by the 1970s. Pressures to decen-
tralise came from the economic recession that made the nation-wide wage system
unsustainable. But decentralisation of collective bargaining took the form of re-fed-
eralisation carrying with it not only the stresses and strains that attend the transition
from state interventionism to a market economy but also the fallouts of the distor-
tions that had characterized intergovernmental relations and fiscal federal practice
under authoritarian military governments. Resolving the federal question became
crucial to stability in public sector industrial relations.
Since there are moves to reform federal practice in Nigeria, involving a review of
the 1999 Constitution bequeathed by the military, decentralised collective bargain-
ing will become the norm in future. Returning to meaningful federalism will not
only improve the practice of collective bargaining especially at the lower levels of
government, it would foreclose labour union demand for national machineries to
review wages in the public services of all tiers of government.
NOTES
(1) Whitely Councils were the machinery for bipartite wage determination in use in the
United Kingdom and were introduced in Nigeria in 1948 by the colonial authorities fol-
lowing two reports by Mr. T.M. Cowan of the British Ministry of Labour and National
Service.
(2) General Agoyi Ironsi’s declaration of Nigeria as unitary state through Decree No. 34,
1966 was the catalyst for the counter coup and pogroms that eventually led to the seces-
sion move by the Igbos and the subsequent 1967-1970 civil war.
(3) Describing intergovernmental relations, the former Chief of General Staff and Vice
President under General Babangida had this to say: “Throughout the life of this adminis-
tration, military Governors were on military posting and were thus required to take
directives from the central administration. First, the office of the Chief of General Staff
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(CGS) maintained close supervision of State Military Governors.... As a control mea-
sure, yearly budget guidelines were issued by the Vice-President (previously CGS) to
the military Governors who were subsequently physically present at the headquarters to
defend their budgets.” He noted that this central government monitored the observance
of these directives and defaulters were duly penalized (Aikhomu, 1996: 51).
(4) More than half of the revenue from the sales tax (V.A.T) collected by the central govern-
ment is derived from Lagos State but the proceeds are shared equally among the states.
(5) The National Assembly has also set up a committee to review the 1999 Constitution.
(6) The federal government has scrapped the NPEC.
(7) Although most of these demands have been issued in communiqués after each confer-
ence, attorneys general of the states have been meeting to fine tune arrangements to table
the issues at the appropriate courts.
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